For the technically curious
Only the people you pick can open your photos. Here's how.
Keekaboo encrypts every photo and video on your phone before it's uploaded. Our servers store files they can't open and keys they can't read. This page shows how it works.
The short version
- Photos and videos
- AES-256-GCM, a random 256-bit key per photo
- Keys to people
- HPKE (RFC 9180) with X-Wing (IETF draft): X25519 and ML-KEM-768 together
- Keys to moments
- AES-256-GCM, one lock per person who gets to see it
- Signatures
- Ed25519 over canonical JSON
- Key derivation
- HKDF-SHA256, with a purpose label on every derived key
- Where keys live
- In the iOS Keychain, or encrypted with an Android Keystore key. A browser keeps them in memory. Our servers only hold them sealed.
What leaves your phone
Your phone scrambles a photo before it leaves. It stays scrambled all the way, until it reaches the phone of someone you picked.
- Your phoneScrambles the photo with a fresh key, before anything is uploaded.
- Our serversKeep the scrambled file. We don't have the key to open it.
- Grandma's phoneUnscrambles it with her own key, and checks it came from you.
What we can read, and what we can't
Your photos and videos are end-to-end encrypted, and so is everything that can be read from them. The words around them aren't: here's each one, and why.
Only your family can open
- Every photo and video, in every sizeThumbnail, full screen, original, and the moving part of a Live Photo.
- The colour preview while a photo loadsA tiny blur of the photo's colours. It's made from the photo, so it's locked with it.
- Where the faces areThe faces your phone finds, so it can centre a photo on them.
- Pictures of peopleProfile pictures, the family picture, and your children's pictures through the years.
- Every keyOur servers only hold keys sealed for someone's phone or computer.
What our servers can read, and why
- Who's in your family, and in which circleThat's how our servers know whose lock to hand out, and stop the moment someone leaves.
- Names and birthdaysSo the app can say who shared what, and how old your child was in a photo.
- Captions, comments, reactions, tags and placesSo the app can show them to the people who see the photo. A tag is a name you pick. A place is a name and a point rounded to about a kilometre.
- Dates, file sizes, dimensions and video lengthTo put your feed in order and load the right size for your screen.
- A tiny blurred glimpse of each photoJust 16 by 16 pixels, made on your phone, and far too small to make out any detail. It shows while the real photo downloads and decrypts, and on an invite page.
- The words in a notificationApple and Google deliver those, so they only say who did what. The photo stays locked.
All of it is stored in Germany and never used for ads. Your phone strips a photo's own location before anything leaves it, so a place only shows up if you add one.
A key per person, a key per moment
Two moments in one family. Circles go from close to wide, and a closer circle also sees what's shared with a wider one. Grandma is in Relatives, the babysitter in Close friends. Follow a person's key to what it can open.
- Bath timeRelativesParentsGrandmano lockmoment keyphotovideo
- Birthday partyFriendsParentsGrandmaBabysittermoment keyphotovideo
Changing who sees what only ever touches locks, so a photo is encrypted exactly once. The parents share one key that also opens everyone else's, so a second parent or a new phone needs only that one. And a moment's key never changes: someone who leaves just never gets a new lock.
A photo's way through
Posting a moment
- Your phone: Clean upRe-encode each photo and video. The location and other camera details stay behind.
- Your phone: Encrypt the filesA fresh random 256-bit key per photo, and AES-256-GCM.
- Our servers: Store the ciphertextThe encrypted files go up.
- Your phone: Seal the detailsA fresh moment key. Each photo's key, preview and faces are sealed under it, and signed by your phone.
- Your phone: Make the locksThe moment key, sealed for each person whose circle gets to see it, and for the parents.
- Our servers: Publish, all at onceIn one go, the database checks there's a lock for everyone who gets to see the moment and for nobody else. Only then does it show up.
Locks are written when the moment is published, not when the upload starts, so someone who left in between never gets one.
Opening a photo
- Grandma's phone: AskShe opens the moment, signed in on her own phone.
- Our servers: Hand over what's hersThe database's access rules return her own lock, the photo details and the encrypted file. No one else's lock.
- Grandma's phone: Open the lockWith her own person key. Only she and the parents hold it.
- Grandma's phone: Check who sent itOpen the details with the moment key, and check the Ed25519 signature against a parent's phone in the parents' logbook (more on that below).
- Grandma's phone: DecryptThe file is checked piece by piece, so a video plays before it's all downloaded, and any change to it fails.
A lock that's missing or doesn't check out means the photo waits or shows an error. There's no fallback to a key our servers can read.
Letting someone in
Signing in gives you an account, not keys. A new person's key only ever comes from a parent's phone, after a parent says yes.
- Grandma's new phoneMakes her identity: a signing key and a receiving key, derived with HKDF from one secret that only she holds.
- Grandma's new phoneSigns a claim to that identity twice: with the identity itself, and with the key of the phone that asked. Without the second signature, our servers could put an identity of their own on her request.
- Your phoneShows who's asking, from which phone, for which family, with a short code you can compare. You say yes.
- Your phoneSeals her person key to her receiving key with HPKE and X-Wing, signs it, and writes a lock for every moment she gets to see.
- Grandma's phoneChecks it was signed by a parent's phone in the parents' logbook, opens her key, and opens her photos.
She gets locks for what's shared with her circle when she joins. Moments kept for a closer circle stay closed to her.
When people come and go
Nobody else in your family hears about it: not who joined, who left, which circle they're in, or how many there are. The app still shows who comments or reacts on what you can see.
| What happens | A parent's phone does | Everyone else receives |
|---|---|---|
| You post a moment | One lock per person who gets to see it | Their own lock |
| Someone is let in | A key for them, and a lock for each moment they get to see | Nothing |
| Someone leaves or is removed | Nothing. Our servers stop handing them anything new; what they already opened, they keep | Nothing |
| Someone moves to a closer circle | Locks for what they now get to see | Nothing |
| Someone moves further out, or a moment is made more private | Nothing. The database drops their locks | Nothing |
| A parent's phone is removed | New keys for everyone, with the old ones sealed inside the new | A new key |
Lost your phone? Your photos aren't.
Each of these brings your key back to a new phone, and none of them reaches us in a form we can open. One is enough, two is safer. Find them under Me, then Photo recovery.
- iCloud Keychain or GoogleA small recovery secret, kept in iCloud Keychain, or in Google's end-to-end encrypted backup when your phone has a screen lock. It happens by itself where that's on, and it's as safe as your Apple or Google account.
- A passkeyYour passkey unlocks a recovery copy we hold encrypted, through WebAuthn PRF. Only that passkey, on your account, can open it.
- A recovery code256 random bits, as a QR code with the text underneath. Print it, or keep it in a password manager.
- Your old phoneYour new phone scans the code on your old phone's screen. It goes from screen to camera, never through us.
Remove a lost phone and our servers stop serving it at once. For a parent's phone, everyone also gets a new key, so even a copy of its keys opens nothing new. Anyone else without a way back is simply let in again by a parent.
The parents' logbook
Every phone in the family follows a signed, hash-linked logbook of who the parents are, which phones they use, and their ways back. It only changes when the parents add or remove one of those, so it says nothing about anyone else.
- Page 1
Family made: Mum, her phone, her way back
- Signed by
- Mum's phone
- Generation
- 1
hash of the page beforePage 2Dad and his phone added
- Signed by
- Mum's phone
- Generation
- 1
hash of the page beforePage 3Mum's old phone removed
- Signed by
- Dad's phone
- Generation
- 2
- Each page names the hash of the one before, and is signed with Ed25519 by a parent's phone the page before lists, or by a parent's own way back for that parent's phones.
- A phone remembers the newest page it checked, and refuses to be taken back to an older one.
- Removing a parent's phone raises the generation. Everyone gets a new key with their older keys sealed inside it, so older moments still open.
- A key is only accepted from a parent's phone on a page of its own generation, so a removed phone can't hand out new keys.
On a computer
- Post from a computerWith Plus, a parent can share from a computer too, say photos straight from a camera. The browser encrypts them before they leave, just like the phone.
- Pair with your phoneYour phone scans a QR code the browser shows. The code binds that exact request, and your phone seals your keys to the browser, which keeps them in memory.
- Sign outOur servers delete what was sealed for the browser. A parent's computer counts as one of their phones, so signing it out renews everyone's key, just like removing a phone.
One difference from the app: a browser loads our code fresh on every visit, while the app's code only changes with an update we sign. So on the web you trust us a little more. If you'd rather not, use the app.
And quantum computers?
Someone could keep what we store today and wait for a quantum computer to break it. Photos of your kids should stay private for decades, so we planned for that.
- ReadyPhotos, videos and momentsAES-256-GCM. A quantum computer at best halves the effective key length, from 256 bits to 128, and 128 is still out of reach.
- ReadyKeys sent to a personEvery key our servers pass to a person's phone or computer is sealed with X-Wing, which combines classic X25519 with post-quantum ML-KEM-768. Breaking it means breaking both.
- Not at stakeSignaturesA signature only has to hold at the moment a phone checks it. Breaking one years from now opens nothing recorded today. When that day comes closer, signatures change with an app update, without touching a single photo.
So the photos, videos and keys we store and send today stay closed, even then.
What this protects against
Every design has edges. These are ours.
Your photos and videos stay locked against
- A leak of our database, our file storage or our backups
- Someone at our hosting providers, or at our company, with access to the database or the files
- Someone who signs in as you on a new phone: an account alone gives no keys
- People in your family learning about each other: who else is in, which circle, or how many
Not protected
- Who's really asking. When someone asks to join, you trust it's them. Like Signal's safety numbers, both phones show the same short code: compare them if you want to be sure
- What's already in someone's hands: a screenshot, a download, or an unlocked phone. That opens everything on it, not just Keekaboo
Our servers can't open a photo or forge a parent's signature. They do decide who gets served, so cutting off a lost phone or someone who left relies on them. They could also hold back a newer page of the logbook, but your phone never accepts an older one.
Why these choices
- X-Wing for keys to people
- X-Wing combines X25519 with ML-KEM-768, and holds as long as either one does.
- AES-256-GCM everywhere else
- Fast in hardware on every phone and computer, with room to spare against quantum search.
- Ed25519 for signatures
- Small, fast, deterministic and everywhere. A signature only needs to hold while it's checked, so it can be replaced later without re-encrypting anything.
- Canonical JSON with exact fields
- Every signed message has exactly one encoding. A field that shouldn't be there is refused, not ignored.
- Context in every seal
- Every derived key and sealed message has a purpose label, and binds the environment, family and object, plus the recipient and generation where there is one.
- Nothing home-made
- WebCrypto and hpke-js in the browser, CryptoKit on iOS, with BoringSSL on iPhones before iOS 26, Bouncy Castle on Android. We wrote the protocol, not the primitives.
How we check it
- Shared test vectors hold TypeScript, Swift and Kotlin to the same bytes.
- Tests for every valid message, and for broken, replayed, reordered and wrongly signed ones.
- We review each change to the protocol on its own, against the code, with proof-of-concept attacks and mutation testing.
- The database rules have their own tests, including what someone in a circle must not be able to read.
Found something? Tell us at security@keekaboo.app.
